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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
• 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14732 
RAY KITCHEN, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ray Kitchen appeals from a judgment and conviction 
entered against him in a jury trial before the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District/ in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Maurice Harding, presiding* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant Ray Kitchen was convicted by a jury of 
aiding and abetting Lynn Christiansen in filing a false or 
fraudulent insurance claim in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-6-521 (Supp. 1976), a felony of the second degree. 
He was duly sentenced to the Utah State Prison for one 
to fifteen years and ordered to pay a fine of $500.00. 
Execution of the prison term was suspended. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of 
the jury in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 14, 1974, Lynn Christiansen's home 
was burglarized and some items were stolen from him 
(Tr.40). He proceeded to file a claim of loss with 
his insurance company, National American Insurance 
Company, for various items, some of which did not belong 
to him or were not stolen from him (Tr.40-41). These 
items included a man's and a woman's ring (which 
Christiansen did not own), a cassette stereo, a clock 
radio and a small silver jewelry case. Christiansen 
testified that of the items that he thought were 
stolen, none of them had been purchased at appellant's 
shop, Lan's Watch Shop (Tr.41-44). When the insurance 
adjuster requested further documentation for some of 
the items on the claim, Christiansen went to the 
appellant to have him prepare receipts for the items 
(Tr.42-43)* Christiansen testified that he told 
appellant of the burglary,that he intended to pad his 
insurance claim (Tr.43), and that he needed Kitchen 
to prepare receipts for a man's ring, a lady's ring, 
a Sony clock radio and a Sony stereo (cassette) (Tr.44). 
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Appellant duly made out the receipts and gave them 
to Christiansen (Tr.44-45) (State's Exhibits 4 and 
5). Christiansen then submitted the claim form and 
receipts in excess of $lf400.00 (Record 22). 
Subsequently, Christainsen received a draft for 
$1,130.75 from the insurance company (Exhibit number 
6), forged his wife's signature on the draft, and 
deposited it in his account (Tr.46;59). 
Apparently, at the request of Christiansen's 
ex-wife, the Utah County Attorney's Office initiated an 
investigation of the payment of the claim. On July 
18, 197 5, two investigators went to appellant's shop 
and asked him if he had prepared the receipts to 
substantiate Christiansen's claim (Tr.30). Appellant 
replied, that he had and further stated that he had 
referred to some cards which he kept for all purchases. 
Appellant told the investigators that he did not have 
the cards at the store but he thought they were probably 
at his home (Tr.31). When the investigators returned, 
appellant stated he was unable to find them (Tr.31). 
The investigators left without the proof of purchase 
they had requested. 
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Lynn Christiansen was granted immunity to 
testify at appellant's trial (Tr.39). At trial, 
appellant was convicted by a jury of aiding and 
abetting the filing of the false or fraudulent 
insurance claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE 
ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL TO 
WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT. 
At common law, accomplice testimony was 
sometimes considered suspect because of the possibility 
an accomplice desired to blame another for a crime, 
and a warning instruction by the court was required, 
admonishing the jury to view the testimony with this 
in mind. This is the practice of the federal judiciary 
and the majority of the states today, 1962 Utah Law 
Review 60. In Utah, and in nearly half the states, 
however, a conviction is not allowed based solely upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended, provides: 
"A conviction shall not be had 
on the testimony of an accomplice 
unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence, which in itself and without 
-4-
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the aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of 
the offense; and the corroboration 
shall not be sufficient,if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or 
the circumstances thereof." 
Question has naturally arisen as to what constitutes 
f,sufficient" corroboration. In State v. Sinclair, 
15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the proper test to determine the 
sufficiency of the corroborative evidence is whether 
there is: 
". . . evidence, independent 
of the testimony of the accomplice, 
which the jury could reasonably 
believe tends to implicate and 
connect the defendant with the 
commission of the crime." Id.,. 
389 P.2d at 468. 
See also State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 
(1970); State v. Clark, 3 Utah 2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1955), 
and cases there cited. This Court elaborated on the 
interpretation of the requisite criteria in State v. 
Vigil, 132 Utah 495, 498, 260 P.2d 539, 541 (1953): 
" . . . the corroboration need 
not go to all the material facts as 
testified by the accomplice, nor 
need it be sufficient in itself to 
support a conviction. . . it may be 
slight and entitled to little 
consideration. However, the 
corroborating evidence must connect 
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the defendant with the commission of 
the offense; and be consistent with 
his guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocence . . . The corroborating 
evidence must do more than cast a 
grave suspicion on the defendant 
and it must do all of these things 
without the aid of the testimony of 
the accomplice." 
Respondent does not insist that the appellant 
has misstated the law in his argument to the Court, but 
does contend that the evidence at trial did satisfy 
the standards set by the Court. At trial, the accomplice, 
Lynn Christiansen, testified that he falsified the claim 
he submitted to his insurance company by adding fictitious 
items to it (T.41). He testified that none of the items 
on the claim had been purchased from the appellant (T.41, 
45-46). He stated that when he received a follow-up 
request for more documentation from the insurance 
adjuster (Tr.42,44), he told the appellant of his plan 
to "pad (his) insurance claim," and that he needed 
receipts for the items he had claimed(Tr.43-44). 
In corroboration of this testimony, the 
insurance adjuster testified that he investigated Mr. 
Christiansen's insurance claim (Tr.12), and that he 
requested and received from Christiansen a second 
-6-
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document containing further information about the 
allegedly stolen items (Tr.14). This second document 
contained such information as the identity of the 
property involved, the age of the property, and 
from where it had been purchased (Tr.15). The 
adjuster testified that he received two receipts, 
State's Exhibit numbers 4 and 5, which were both 
stamped "Lan's Watch Service" (Tr.17). He stated 
that the property listed on the two receipts and the 
sales prices on them were consistent with the items 
reported on the claim forms (Tr.17). The adjuster 
testified that pursuant to the terms of Christiansen1s 
insurance policy and the items claimed stolen together 
with the receipts, the insurance company paid the claim 
(Tr.19). 
Connie Christiansen, Lynn Christiansen1s 
ex-wife, testified that although she had purchased a 
diamond ring for her then-husband, she did not purchase 
it from the appellant (Tr.25). She stated that to her 
knowledge her husband did not own a Sony stereo cassette 
during their marriage, that her husband did not own a 
man's dinner ring, and that the only diamond ring she 
owned during their marriage was her wedding ring (T.26). 
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Mrs. Christiansen further testified that her husband 
never told her of any burglary and subsequent theft 
of property (Tr.29). r-; ; 
Brent Bullock, investigator for the Utah 
County Attorney's Office, testified that he 
investigated the payment of Christiansen's insurance 
claim (Tr.30). He stated he visited the appellant and 
showed him copies of the receipts stamped with Lan's 
Watch Service (Tr.30-31). He testified that the 
appellant indicated that he had made out those receipts 
(Tr.31). Additionally, Bullock testified as to the 
rest of their conversation that day: 
"Q. Was there a further 
conversation? 
A. Yes, I asked him if he had 
made these receipts out because of 
information that was supplied to him 
by Mr. Christensen or had he referred 
to something that he would have kept as 
far as records. He stated that he 
had referred to some cards which he 
kept with all of these purchases. I 
asked him if he had those cards in his 
possession. He stated that he did not 
have them at his store at that time, 
but he thought they were probably at 
his place of residence. I asked Mr. 
Kitchen if he would secure these 
receipts for us and return the proceeding 
Monday, which would have been July the 
21st. We never went back until the 22nd, 
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which was a Tuesday. I asked Mr. 
Kitchen if in fact he had those 
receipts or had those cards that 
he had referred to, and he stated 
that he was unable to find them. 
Q. I take it then you were 
investigating Mr. Christensen, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. Did you have any other 
conversations with Mr. Kitchen? 
Was there any other conversation 
on the two occasions to which you 
have testified? 
A. Yes, I asked him if his 
records would reflect for the 
approximate dates of these receipts 
this amount of money that had been 
transacted and he stated it probably 
would and he referred us to his CPA 
firm, and we indicated that we would 
go talk to them, and then he stated 
to us it may possibly not reflect that, 
because it was a cash transaction. 
I then asked him if he had any receipts 
or warranty cards that he might keep with 
the Sony equipment and he stated that it 
was the responsibility of the person who 
was buying that to send that into the 
factory. 
Q. Did he state to you anyone else 
had prepared those documents? 
A. No, he did not. 
He stated that he had prepared 
them." (Tr.31-32). 
Wayne Watson also investigated the claim for the 
Utah County Attorney's Office (Tr.35). Much of his testimony 
corroborated Mr. Bullock's testimony, adding that when he 
and Bullock returned to the appellant's shop to pick up 
the original receipts, the appellant did not say that 
he had tried to find them but needed more time to locate 
them (Tr.37). 
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The appellant himself added corroborative 
evidence by admitting that he prepared the State's 
Exhibit numbers 4 and 5 which were the two receipts 
submitted to the insurance adjuster (Tr.78). He 
testified that Christiansen had told him he had been 
burglarized (Tr.79). 
At that time, the appellant indicated he 
would prepare the receipts for him (Tr.79). Appellant 
testified that he did prepare the receipts, Exhibits 
4 and 5, and gave them an itemization of the items (Tr. 
86). He further testified that he represented the value 
of the items for the receipts only from memory, even 
though they were allegedly purchased with cash (Tr.87). 
He testified that he represented the dates the items 
were purchased only from memory (Tr.88-89), and that 
he did not inform the insurance company that the 
receipts he made out were not the actual receipts 
for those days (Tr.89). Appellant admitted that the 
amounts for the rings on the receipts were higher than 
the amounts listed on his cards (Tr.93). 
In his instructions to the jury, the trial 
court stated the essential elements of the crime 
charged that the State was required to prove: 
-1 n-
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wl. That one Lynn Christensen had an insurance 
contract with the National American Insurance Company 
which provided insurance to him against property loss 
by theft. 
2. That on or about August 12, 1974, he claimed 
that certain of his property had been stolen and filed a 
claim for the loss in the sum of $1,130.75 with his 
insurance carrier, which claim was false and fraudulent. 
3. That to substantiate such loss, he obtained 
on or about August 12, 1974, at Utah County, Utah purchase 
receipts for certain items of the claim from the defendant. 
4. That the receipts supplied by defendant 
were for a sum in excess of $1,000.00, and were fictitious, 
and the defendant knew they were fictitious. 
5. That the defendant knew such receipts were 
to be filed as a part of Lynn Christensenys claim with 
his insurance carrier. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each 
and all of the essential elements of the offense charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the 
defendant; but if the evidence has failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt any one or more of such elements, then 
you should find the defendant not guilty." 
Instruction No. 3 (Record-33,34). (Emphasis added.) 
- n -
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Respondent submits that the corroborative 
evidence meets the standards previously established by 
this Court in that it connects the appellant with the 
commission of the fraud by his preparing the receipts 
at Christiansen's request. Further, by his own 
admission, appellant stated that the sales prices 
listed on the receipts were higher than those on his 
"cards." Again, by his own admission, appellant stated 
that the receipts were to be filed as a part of 
Christiansen's claim. This evidence, which is independent 
of Christiansen's testimony, clearly connects the 
appellant with the fraud and satisfies the sufficiency 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as 
amended. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS 
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN BOTH THE FOLLOWING WAYS: 
(A) THE CLAIM FILED WAS "FALSE OR FRAUDULENT" AS PER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521 (SUPP. 1975); AND (B) THE 
VALUE OF THE FRAUDULENT CLAIM EXCEEDED $1,000.00. 
A. Appellant was convicted of aiding and 
abetting Lynn Christiansen to present or cause to be 
presented proof in support of a false or fraudulent 
-12-
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claim upon a contract of insurance for the payment of 
a loss in the amount of $1,130.7 5 with intent to allow 
it to be presented in support of said claim (Record-63). 
Appellant relies on Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 
596, 206 Pac. 711 (1922), to support his contention 
that this Court should hold that Christiansen's claim 
Was not fraudulent but merely excessive. In the Burke 
case, the plaintiff, a county commissioner, sought to 
prohibit the defendants (judges) from proceeding in an 
action brought against the plaintiff by the county 
attorney. The Utah Supreme Court decided the question 
whether plaintiff's writ of prohibition should be granted 
or whether the defendants should be allowed to try and 
remove the plaintiff from his office of county 
commissioner. One of the charges against the plaintiff 
was that he had presented a claim purportedly to 
reimburse him for travelling expenses in his capacity 
as county commissioner. The Court discussed the 
problems with these types of claims, stating: 
"Minds might honestly and 
reasonably differ as to what would 
be a just and proper charge per 
mile for travel . . * Indeed, minds 
might differ as to the actual 
distance covered in passing from 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
one place to another . . . True, 
it is alleged plaintiff presented 
a 'false and fraudulent claim,1 
but that statement imparts no 
information but the bare conclusion 
of the pleader predicated on no 
specific facts." Id., 206 P.2d 
at 714. 
The Court was concerned with the fact that although 
the claim which was the subject matter of the suit 
should have been a matter of public record, the county 
attorney did not use that public record to properly 
prepare his complaint: 
"In similar cases brought to 
the attention of this court the 
actual thing or acts complained of 
as constituting the fraud upon the 
county were fully set forth and pointed 
out in the accusation. Until that is 
done in this case the accusation must 
be held insufficient for want of facts, 
the plaintiff be not required to 
answer, nor the trial court permitted 
to proceed." Id. at 715. 
A lack of proper pleading in this case is 
certainly not the question before the Court. However, 
even if the facts in the instant case squared with those 
in Burke, the insurance claim submitted by Christiansen 
would still be fraudulent, not excessive. The claim in 
Burke was merely an extension of a valid, similarly existing 
claim for travel. In the case at bar, Christiansen 
submitted claims not only for items not stolen but for 
items he never owned; and the appellant prepared receipts Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for items he never sold. This insurance claim complies 
with the Burke definition of a false or fraudulent 
claim in that the essential facts were pleaded, the 
claim was for items which did not exist at all, and 
the claim was made with intent to commit a felony. 
Id, at 714. 
As to the other two cases cited in appellant's 
brieff respondent submits that they do not stand for the 
proposition asserted by appellant. Therefore, the 
insurance claim should be regarded as false or fraudulent 
as per Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1953), as amended. 
B, The value of the fraudulent claim exceeded 
$1,000.00. Appellant was charged in the information with 
aiding and abetting "Lynn Christiansen to present or cause 
to be presented proof in support of a false or fraudulent 
claim upon a contract of insurance for payment of a loss 
in the amount of $1,130.75 with intent to allow it to be 
presented in support of said claim" (Record-63). The 
$1,130.75 figure represents the amount of the draft paid 
to Christiansen. In Instruction No. 3 (Record-33), the 
trial court required the jury to find "that the receipts 
supplied by defendant were for a sum in excess of 
-15-
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$1,000.00, • . . ." (Emphasis added.) Appellant did 
not take exception to Instruction No. 3 nor any other 
(Tr.lQ7). The receipts, State's Exhibit numbers 4 and 
5, showed a total value of $1,400.00 (Record-22). 
These receipts corresponded with value given by 
Christiansen in his claim. The trial court did 
not distinguish any portion of the claim or receipts 
as fraudulent in its instructions, and clearly the 
jury could find that more than $1,000.00 of the claim 
and receipts was fictitious: Christiansen and appellant 
valued the man's ring at $325.00; they valued the woman's 
ring at $350.00; they valued the cassette stereo at 
$389.00, yet Christiansen admitted he thought the value 
really only $120.00 (Tr.60); and they valued the Sony 
clock radio, although it is unclear from the record at 
what figure they valued it. 
It is clear that even if the jury considered 
only part of the claim as fraudulent, they still could 
arrive at a value of property exceeding $1,000.00. 
Moreover, appellant's reliance on Burke v. Knox, supra, 
for the proposition that only the false or fraudulent 
portion of a claim, that is, the excessive portion, may 
be prosecuted, is not well-founded for the reasons stated 
(A) of Point II. Further, it would create a bad policy 
+-n so interpret Section 76-6-521 because the question Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
what is a false or fraudulent claim is a question of fact 
for the jury. In this case, the jury found that 
Christiansen filed a false or fraudulent claim in excess 
of $1,000-00 and that Kitchen aided and abetted in his •' 
doing so. The appellant therefore was properly convicted 
of a second degree felony and his conviction should not be 
disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The corrorobation of Christiansen's testimony 
met the test for sufficiency as defined by this Court and 
the jury reasonably found that the false or fraudulent 
claim exceeded $1,000.00 necessary for conviction of 
second degree felony. Therefore, respondent requests 
that appellant's conviction and sentence be affirmed and 
this appeal dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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